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Ctirrency Coiivertil~ility: Wlieii auJ Ho.~.?
A Coiitriliutiou to tlie 13ul~arian Debute~`
By Eduard J. Bomhoff, Rotterdam
I. Introduction
Economic growth in Bulgaria has been stagnant since 1989, inflation is
going up and the Lev is rapidly losing its value in terms of other currencies.
In March 1990, the Bulgarian authorities declared a moratorium on the
country's external debt. Under these difficult economic circumstances, an
intense debate has been engaged about the appropriate future monetary pol-
icy of the nation, and many new options are open now that Bulgaria has
been accepted in the 1990 annual meetings as a member of the IMF and the
World Bank.
It would be inappropriate for a first time visitor to Bulgaria to ofter firm
advice on policy for a country on which little research has beeii published
and for which the past in any event no longer provides much guidance about
the future. Currency convertibility and monetary policy have to be discussed
under conditions of great economic and political flux, not only in Bulgaria
itself, but also in all of its ex-Comecon trading partners. Nevertheless it may
be of some use to recall a number of arguments that are important for decid-
ing upon the date of the transition to convertibility as well as the form in
which convertibility might take place.
II. Timing of Convertibility
Within one year of the political changes of November 1989, a consensus
has formed in Bulgaria that the Lev must become a convertible currency.
Officially this has been underlined by the acceptance of Bulgaria as a mem-
' Revised version of a lecture at the second International Varna Seminar On the
Way to Convertibility in Central and East European Countries, October 1990. Prof.
Dc Tndor Vaftchev, Dr. Lyubomir Mitov and Prof. Nesho Tzarevski provided useful
insights about the Bulgarian economy. John Williamson and other Seminar partici-
pants gave stimulating comments. The views in this paper are solely my own.
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ber of the IMF which stipulates in article VIII of its Articles of Agreement:
„no member shall without the permission of the Fund impose restrictions on
the making of payments and transfers for current international transac-
tions". However, according to Article XIV member countries may preserve
temporarily the existing limitations and controls on current payments. As
members of the Fund, however, countries must strive to make the transition
to convertibility when economic conditions make this possible.
Bulgarian economists differ about the timing of a move to convertibility.
Mitov writes: "Different views have been voiced. Some understand conver-
tibility solely as the product of a balanced and strong economy, postponing
the problem to the indefinite future. Others plead for this immediate
introduction, despite existing shortages and imbalances in the economy -
seeing convertibility as a means to economic recovery, despite inherent
risks".
A realistic debate about the timing of a move to convertibility on current
account must take into consideration that foreign currency already plays an
important role in all Central and Eastern European economies. U.S. dollars
and DMarks are widely accepted in urban areas, and may even be the
preferred medium of exchange for many residents. This seems to be the
essential difference between the situation in Eastern Europe today and, for
example, in Western Europe after World War II. The other crucial difference
with other times when countries contemplated making their currencies con-
vertible is that in Eastern Europe the transition from a collectivist to a mar-
ket economy has been agreed in principle but still needs to be implemented.
It seems to me that these two factors together make earlier views about the
timing of the change to eonvertibility no longer directly applicable to East-
ern Europe today.
Here are some well-known traditional arguments for caution:
Political uncertainty and the general wish to diversify one's portfolio may
induce residents to move part of their savings to foreign countries. With
currency convertibility the implicit costs of doing so are much reduced,
even if the currency is only convertible for transactions on current
account. Over-invoicing of imports, under-invoicing of exports and a
variety of other legal or illegal means are available once the currency
becomes converlible for trade and tourism. It may be in the national inter-
est, however, to stimulate domestic savings and to discourage for at least
some time international diversification of domestic wealth. A non-conver-
tible currency may make it much more costly to transfer part of domestic
wealth abroad.
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- Tourists going abroad may use valuable foreign currency and - once again -
invest their wealth or even their talents in foreign countries. A non-conver-
tible currency allows for political control over outward-bound tourism.
All such arguments against early convertibility involve substantial politi-
cal control over economic transactions and important limilations on the
freedom of contract between domestic residents and foreigners. Here follow
some points associated with postponing the move to convertibility:
- If government has the power to allocate foreign exchange, this will easily
become a source of corrupted practices and will involve a bureaucracy
that is costly not only in the direct budgetary sense but also because vital
imports may be delayed through excessive red tape.
- Domestic entrepreneurs may judge that black market activities and
smuggling may offer attractive rewards, but there is a difference belween
the private and social benefits of such activities.
- Distorted domestic relative prices that are out of line with world prices
complicate business life for domestic firms and have social costs. A con-
vertible currency makes distorted domestic prices far more visible and
may even prevent continued distortions because of substitution effects
both in production and consumption. For instance, in Westei~n Europe the
past few years have shown how much discipline is imposed on domestic
governments in the area of taxation because of further integration of the
financial, labour, and goods markets in the European Community. We
observe a clear convergence of Value Added Tax rates as well as of income
tax schedules not because the different politicians have come to agree
about the optimal structure of taxation, but because their residents will
move either their purchases or their work effort abroad if induced to do so
by glaring differences in rates of taxation.
Possibly of all these arguments the final argument against postponing the
transition to convertibility should dominate. For, the transition to a market
economy will suffer if domestic relative prices differ substantially from
world prices, or if there is persistent political uncertainty about the continu-
ation or termination of such distortions. To impose domestic relative prices
that are more in agreement with world market conditions will initially
impose heavy adjustment costs on consumers and producers. Families have
become used to subsidization of food and some basic commodities. The
benefits of more realistic prices do not appear immediately; the costs of
reduced subsidies hurt directly. For that reason alone, removal of distor-
tions in relative prices will stimulate strong political opposition on the con-
sumer side. Producers will have to make equally hard adjustments if impor-
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tant relative prices and subsidies change. A very important advantage of
currency convertibility is that the speed with which domestic relative prices
adjust to conditions in the world market no longer depends on domestic
political conditions but is imposed from abroad.
External discipline has worked well in putting some constraints on taxa-
tion policies in the European Community; it may also be the most feasible
way to achieve a more sensible structure of relative prices in the economies
of Eastern Europe. With a convertible currency the whole world market is
on your side if you wish to remove distortions in relative prices. Because
future prosperity requires a market economy, and a market economy in turn
presupposes realistic relative prices and far fewer distortions, immediate
currency convertibility may help to import a relative price structure that
could be politically impossible to obtain through individual domestic politi-
cal decisions.
I should also like to suggest that the bias in favour of large firms and
against small firms and new entrepreneurs may be an additional very
important argument to remove control over foreign exchange from the cen-
tral authorities. In my own country, the Netherlands, politicians belonging
to the two largest political parties are now actively debating the amount of
government support that would be needed to help Philips, the struggling
electronics firm. And this within a context of strong economic growth, a
very tight labour market and an unsustaineably large budget deficit. Gov-
ernment subsidization of Philips implies higher taxes to the detriment of
othcr firms and potential new entrepreneurs. However, in the "market" for
political influence large existing companies have a more concentrated
power in favour of subsidies than those who eventually pay the budgetary
costs. In addition, Hayek's warnings that governments have no comparative
advantage in guessing which future activities are most promising (and
would best be served with foreign exchange) apply with full force. Finally,
political control over foreign exchange imposes unavoidable heavy distor-
tions in the domestic credit market. Same companies may find it easy to gen-
erate cash flow or to attract capital in order to expand, but may fail to
obtain foreign exchange for vital imports of machinery. Other businesses
may have little cash flow and few attractions for potential creditors, but
they enjoy the political connections that are helpful in obtaining foreign
exchange. A"shadow" market in foreign exchange will appear in which
firms and individuals will try to obtain licenses to import. However, there
~vill be a varying degree of political control over this "market", leading to an
uncertain and inefficient set of constraints on firms' activities.
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The Soviet Union and some of the other ex-socialist economies have pro-
moted cooperative forms of organization for smaller enterprises. Some
cooperatives are spin-offs of larger state-owned firms; others have arisen to
perform tasks that were neglected in the past. As long as domestic relative
prices remain grossly distorted, managers of state firms may take a personal
pecuniary interest in a new cooperative and deal with these smaller pri-
vately-owned satellites in ways that are socially harmful even though indi-
vidually profitable. For instance, a state firm may sell subsidized inputs to a
cooperative which then subsequently sells its output at a realistic price.
News reports from Eastern Europe suggest that such practices are strongly
disliked by the public, which suspects big-firm managers to have a selfish
interest in some cooperatives. By contrast, other cooperatives may be elimi-
nated by state firms that have exclusive rights to foreign exchange or cheap
government-provided inputs and compete with the cooperative in consumer
markets. It would be regrettable if the transitional phase to a market econ-
omy was greatly hampered by these two different types of problems and
this may be one additional reason to favour policies such as immediate con-
vertibility of the currency that lead to a realistic relative price structure.
The transition to a market economy will witness the establishment of many
small firms which have to survive a symbiosis with a number of extrem-
ely large enterprises, either state-owned or not yet privatised. It is essen-
tial that the new firms and cooperatives can compete on equal terms with
the state-owned-conglomerates. This requires that the so-called soft budget
constraint for the state-owned enterprises is replaced by a binding budget
constraint. In other words, losses must have consequence also for socialized
firms. Additionally, the rule of law obviously must apply not only to the new
privatized firms and cooperatives, but also to the state-owned businesses:
Bureaucratic favouritism has no place in a true market economy. It would be
naive to forget that politicians and bureaucrats have a natural tendency to
give more weight to the problems of large existing firms than to the difficul-
ties facing new and unknown enterprises. But, the design of institutions and
policies should counter this bias as much as possible. Within this context, an
immediate move to convertibility of the currency makes much more sense
than continued bureaucratic allocation of foreign exchange to business and
individuals.
Table 1: Fised Rates
1) "automatic Central Bank" (Hong Kong)
2) Currency union (Belgium - Luxemburg)
3) fixed by multinational agreement (E. M. S.)
4) fixed unilaterally (Austria, Norway)
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Table 2: Flerible Rates
1) almast no interventions
'l) "leaning against the wind"
3) wide, secret target zones
4) crawling peg with very frequent adjustments
III. Form of Convertibility
First, a brief review of the different options that are open to a small econ-
omy which makes its currency convertible. Table 1 shows four different
versions of fixed exchange rates; table 2 four ways to implement flexible
exchange rates.
Many of the small trading nations of Western Europe have opted for some
form of fixed exchange rates. Obviously, these countries have concluded
that their national economy is not an optimum currency area and that they
should provide their citizens and business firms with a system in which for-
eign transactions with at least some major trading partners can be con-
ducted with little or no currency risk. Membership of the EMS is increasing,
because German dominance has delivered low and stable inflation for many
years. If a new member country ties its currency to the DMark in a manner
that is viewed as credible by the financial markets, the country „buys" repu-
tation from the Bundesbank. As long as Germany continues to dominate the
system, the reputation of its Central Bank is a public good that can be pro-
vided to new members without diminishing its supply to the old members of
the EMS.
For new members, the „quality" of the national money may improve
through a tie-in with this German dominated system, and credibility may be
purchased more cheaply than if the Central Bank had to obtain a strong
reputation for anti-inflationary policies on its own.
On the other side of the ledger there are obvious transitional costs as the
new EMS-member must adjust to lower inflation. Also, domestic politicians
gíve up the possibility to use the Central Bank for stimulating the economy
in an election year. Such misuse of the Central Bank in order to generate a
„political business cycle" is a temptation in all countries that set their own
monetary policies. One of the important advantages of a system such as the
EMS for the citizens of the participating countries is that the common mon-
etary policy vv~ill not be under as much of a threat to play its part in promot-
ing re-election of sitting governments as in the case in which each country
implements its o~vn monetary policy.
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Given all these advantages of a common monetary policy and a common
inflationary path for participating member countries, should one advocate
some form of cooperation between the monetary authorities in the small
economies of Eastern Europe and the Bundesbank? Note first that countries
may unilaterally decide to couple their monetary policies to those of the
Bundesbank or the provider of any other major currency. Austria is a good
example. The Austrian money market has been integrated for many years
with the German money market and the Austrian monetary authorities can
conduct open market-operations in DMark. This system does not require
any form of approval by the German authorities and has resulted in an
exchange rate between the Austrian Schilling and the DMark that is as
stable as the exchange rate between the DMark and any of the EMS-part-
ners. Hence, we can discuss whether the economies of Eastern Europe
should try to emulate the Austrian example without having to wait for con-
sent by the current membership of the EMS.
Some influential experts have advocated an even stronger form of fixed
exchange rates. Allan H. Meltzeri has advocated a monetary authority for
the Soviet Union along the lines of the Hong Kong Example. He writes:
"credibility for the new monetary policy can be achieved most effectively if
the new system is seen to be a major departure from the old, and the oppor-
tunities for discretion are severely restricted. The public must be convinced
that the central bank and government will honor their commitment to avoid
inflation. I suggest that this is done most effectively if you restrict the gov-
ernment's monetary role by establishing a monetary authority like the Hong
Kong or Singapore monetary authority. In such systems the exchange rate
is fixed. The authorities are empowered to issue money only if they receive
convertible currency, and they must withdraw money when they lose con-
vertible currency. They collect seigniorage, but they have no discretionary
authority to change the quantity of money and no legal means of doing so.
Money can only be issued to the extent that the country earns convertible
currency.
This system has several advantages. Most important is the durability of
the commitment. Like Ulysses, in the ancient Greek legend, you will have
bound yourself tightly. There are other advantages. Let me spell out a few.
First, the system focusses attention on the need to compete in world mar-
kets. Efficiency in international markets begets domestic efficiency, and
increased domestic efficiency encourages exporting. Second, domestic
prices would adjust toward world levels. If the exchange rate is fixed to the
~ Monetary Reform in the U.S.S.R., Moscow Address, September 17, 1990.
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dollar or the mark, domestic commodity prices will move toward U.S. or
German prices for goods of the same quality. Third, interest rates will fall
toward a world level. At first there would be a risk premium but the pre-
mium would decline as confidence grows that the system will be maintained.
Fourth, budget deficits would be limited. All borrowing, whether denomi-
nated in domestic or foreign currency, would have to be financed from
domestic or foreígn saving ... This would be a strong commitment. The
closer you come to it, the more it will be believed. A mixed system in which
the exchange rate is fixed but adjustable will be less credible. If people
doubt your commitment to monetary stability they will charge risk pre-
miums in interest rates and wages to pay for possible inflation."
In this strong form of fixed exchange rates, credibility and stability are
purchased abroad and achieved more quickly than under any alternative
scheme. However, the fixed exchange rate implies that domestic inflation is
given by world inflation so that not only domestic relative prices are
imported from abroad - a very desirable matter - but also domestic absolute
prices are given and no longer under much control by the domestic
authorities. For a developed economy with a stable or at most slowly chang-
ing economic system this may not be a disadvantage. For instance, if there is
macroeconomic pressure on average wage costs in industry in the Nether-
lands to decline relative to production costs in Germany, the magnitude of
such a decline will be at most a few percentage points. Given that German
wage rates increase at, say, 3- 5 percent per year there is sufficient room to
obtain a some~vhat lower rate of increase in Dutch wage costs for one or two
years and the desired adjustment in relative cost levels may be obtained.
In Eastern Europe, the economies are currently engaging in an unpre-
cedented economic transformation and it is impossible to predict where cost
levels will turn out to be next year, in five years and in ten years time. This
uncertainty is starkly reflected by considering current black market
exchange rates and relative wages in Eastern Europe, neighbouring coun-
tries such as Turkey and Greece and the higher developed economies of
Western Europe. At current black market exchange rates it would appear
wage costs in Eastern Europe are a small fraction of those in, for instance,
Turkey with thc differential increasing even further at this time. From a
longer turn perspective, which would base relative cost levels on fundamen-
tal factors such as educational levels of the work force, institutional stabil-
ity, infrastructure and natural resources, it might be extreme to expect a
continuation-of the situation in which wage costs in, for instance, Bulgaria
are five times lower than in the industrial sector in Turkey. Hence, there
2A Krcdit und Kapilal 3~ 1991
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cannot but be extreme uncertainty about the proper wage cost levels in the
economies of Eastern Europe over the next several years.
Under such circumstances fixing the nominal exchange rate imposes all
necessary macroeconomic adjustments on nominal wages. It might be neces-
sary to alter nominal wage levels by very substantial amounts over several
consecutive years. This, in my view, will impose great hardships on wage
earners and will also make it impossible in the meantime to ask wage ear-
ners to engage in longer-term nominal contracts such as home morigages.z
What about fixing the exchange rate for a briefer period and without
going to tlie extreme of the Hong Kong model? Early evaluations of the
Polish experiment strongly suggests that fixing the exchange rate for a lon-
gish period on the basis of the most recent black market exchange rate
results in an initial undervaluation. For, the black market exchange rate
was formed in a period of great uncertainty about the future exchange rate
regime and possibly during conditions of incipient hyperinflation. Currency
substitution will be extremely important unter such circumstances and the
demand for domestic money very low. In fact, estimates suggested that two
thirds of the currency circulating in Poland was foreign currency rather
than domestic currency. Additionally, fixing the exchange rate will not
reduce domestic inflation as measured in domestic currency to world levels
overnight. Probably domestic inflation will continue to be substantially
above world inflation and this again will influence the initial setting of the
fixed exchange rate. Combining these two factors may well result in a severe
undervaluation which is costly because it leads to wrong decisions by pro-
ducers and consumers and is in itself a source of inflationary pressure. This
would suggest great caution in fixing the exchange rate for a longer period
of time and not necessarily following the most recent black market rate.
There is an obvious trade-off between attempting to achieve immediate
credibility for the monetary authorities through fixing the exchange rate
but imposing great costs on the labour market, or opting for a less fixed
2 Some form of indexation of savings and mortgage contracts would help: Under
indexation the real rate of interest is fixed when the claim is bought or sold in the pri-
mary market, and additionally inflation is compensated for once or twice a year. lt
must be possible to combíne indexed long-term savings with indexed home
mortgages, but it will be difficult for the banks to assume any mismatch of maturitics
in such an indexed market under a fixed exchange rate with great uncertainty about
future rates of inflation. For under a Hong Kong type system the banks will have nom-
inal (non-indexed) reserve instruments dominate. It is hard to see how banks could
then offer indexed mortgages to new home owners, without some governmental
institution providing insurance of all default risk on such assets as well as providing
help with any mismatch between indexed savings and indexed mortgages.
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exchange rate regime which will be easier on wage formation in the labour
market but implies that credibility for monetary and exchange rate policy
will take longer to achieve.
At the other extreme end of this spectrum would be a purely floating
exchange rate. This has not been the institution of choice for the trading
nations of Western Europe, the sole exception being Switzerland. In North
America, however, Canada has maintained a floating exchange rate with
respect to the U.S., even though the United States is a more dominating
trading and investment partner for Canada than any nation in Western
Europe with respect to Germany. Hence, a floating exchange rate is a feasi-
ble option, but most smaller nations prefer a fixed exchange rate with a
major partner or participation in a fixed exchange rate system such as the
E114S. For Eastern Europe a pure float would appear to have an overriding
disadvantage, namely that it would be viewed as indicating a lack of disci-
pline in the area of fiscal policy. Currently, statistics on budget deficits and
the way in which they are financed are scarce and of poor quality so that
international financial markets are very uncertain about the fiscal policies
being followed. The transition to a market economy generates continuing
tincertainty about budgetary policies for many more years: How quickly will
subsidies be abolished, how easy will it be for displaced workers to find new
employment, how much infrastructure is required to attract foreign direct
investment and to make a more attractive home for domestic savings, and
finally, how much of the government's expenditures can be covered with
domestic taxation? None of these questions will have predictable answers
for several years to come.
If the authorities choose a floating exchange rate it will be regarded as a
sign that they do not wish to give up the option of covering part of future
deficits through money creation with its consequences for the value of the
currency. Because the monetary base as a stock is small in respect to the
annual uncertainty regarding the government budget deficit, any news
about future budget deficits and the extent to which they may be tinanced
through Central Bank creation of new money will have a major impact on
the market's expectation of the future monetary base. Hence, great uncer-
tainty regarding the exchange rate will result and the foreign value of the
currency will fluctuate with each piece of news regarding future budgetary
policy. Such uncertainty about exchange rate movements even in the very
shoc-t run will be costly for businesses and individuals.
ZA'
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IV. Real Rates of Interest
A common policy mistake in many developing countries has been for lhe
authorities to intervene in the credit market and to depress real rates of
interest. On the surface, such actions provide borrowers with a reduced cost
of capital, but the policy makes no sense because it reduces the amount of
savings. Hence, the supply of credit through the official sector of the econ-
omy falls so much short of the demand of the government influenced inter-
est rate, that credit rationing becomes a necessity, with all its disadvantages
of political bias in favour of large established enterprises and risk of corrup-
tion. At the same time, an informal „curb" market for credit will develop in
which borrowers who cannot be satisfied on the official market will try to
attract funds at higher - possily even illegal - rates of interest. Such a two-
tier credit market is hugely inefficient.
Government should not be afraid of a high real rate of interest, bccause
with stable political and legal conditions, the current scarcity of capital
should imply a very high marginal real return on new capital and hence, a
real rate of interest that is high by the standards of the capital-rich indus-
trial countries. Experience in several developing countries has shown that
deregulation of the credit market and a move towards higher returns for
domestic savers coincided with a take-off of economic growth.
During the transition to a market economy the authorities may wish to
either establish a national savings bank or to issue guarantees for the return
on savings attracted by private sector or foreign-owned banks. If there is a
national savings bank, the authorities therefore have to set a rate of interest
for domestic savings. If the rate of inflation over the relevant horízon is
uncertain it may be sensible to offer a guaranteed real rate of return and to
compensate the domestic savers afterwards for the actual rate of inflation,
using a scheme simular to that of the indexed national savings in the United
Kingdom.3 With a rate of exchange that is fixed for long periods, domestic
short-term interest rates no longer are free policy variables, because the
authorities will have to follow a target for the stock of international
reserves. To the extent to which the domestic banking system needs to be
provided with net foreign assets, solvability of the domestic banks will also
constrain the freedom to alter domestic rates of return on savings. With
short-term rates needed as instruments to maintain the fixed exchange rate,
~ The real rate of return on indexed retail savings in the U.K. is very slightly posi-
tive; simultaneously the U.K. authorities have issued indexed government debt since
1981 on which real rates of return have varied from 2 percent to slightly above 4 per-
cent per annum.
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the authorities will have less chance to follow policies at the long-term end
of the yiPld curve that provide high and stable rates of return to domestic
long-term savers.
By contrast, a more flexib)e rate of exchange allows for far greater freedom
in following an interest rate policy that is targeted towards encouraging
domestic savings and discouraging currency substitution into foreign cur-
rencies or capital flight.~
With the resource cost of the Hong Kong type system so much larger,
because the country has to borrow to set up its central bank and commercial
banking system rather than attracting capital for investment in infrastruc-
ture, and given the tremendous uncertainty regarding the medium-term
evolvement of real wage costs, a rather more flexible system seems advisa-
ble.s However, a more flexible exchange rate does not mean that fiscal defi-
cits can convenient)y continue to be financed through money creation or
that the need to move to a domestic structure of relative prices that con-
forms better to world market conditions is less urgent.
In my view, the best transitional regime for the countries in Eastern
Europe may be a rather flexib)e fixed rate or a rather fixed flexible rate:
either a unilateral fix for a relatively brief period or a crawling peg system
with quite frequent adjustments. Under either system the domestic banks
can operate with reserves denominated primarily in domestic currency and
there is no need for the nation as a whole to allocate foreign reserves to serve
as reserves to the banking system. In a Hong Kong type system or in any
other version of long-term fixation of the exchange rate and full convertibil-
ity on current account, the domestic banks will only be able to grow if a sub-
stantial part of their capital and reserves either consists of foreign currency
or can be converted into such a little notice and with little cost.
~ Obviously a devaluing exchange rate leads to higher domestic interest rates, but
the "spikes" in interest rates, particularly at the short end, that are so typical for the
final stages of a tixed exchange rate that becomes harder and harder to defend can be
avoided.
5 1Vn(cers and Hamke have also argued in favour of a Currency Board rather than
an indcpendent Central Bank for the ex-socialist countries. Prof. Tew pointed out thc
t~co pmblems with such a proposal - how does the Currency Board acquire its forcign
assets?; do Commercial Banks also have to own large stocks of foreign assets? - in an
intervcntion in the London "Financial Times" ( February 23, 1990).
424 Berichte
V. Currency Reform - A IIistorical Case Study
After World War II the Netherlands regained its freedom in May 1945. A
new civilian government came into office at the end of June. Between July
and late September a thorough currency reform was unacted. It goes with-
out saying that post-war conditions were in many ways different, both polit-
ically and economically, from the situation in which the ex-socialist coun-
tries of Eastern Europe find themselves today. But, the currency reform
coped with a very substantial „monetary overhang" and was supported
democratically. Also, Holland had to rebuild its economy with very little
foreign financial assistance while simultaneously facing a drain on
resources because of its costly initial resistance to the independence move-
ment in Indonesia, a former Dutch colony.
An authoritative analysis of the 1945 currency reform was published in
1973 by the responsible ex-Minister of Finance, Pieter Lieftinck who after
leaving the Netherlands had a distinguished career at the IMF and the
World Bank.e When Lieftinck became Minister ot Finance shortly after the
war, national income was estimated by the Dutch authorities to be 5 billion
guilders, but private sector estimates at that time were seven or eight billion,
evidencing a substantial uncertainty about the transactions demand for
money.' The money supply at war-end amounted to 11 billion guilders, over
tour times as much as at the start of the war in 1940. With national income
in current guilders slightly below the 1938 level obviously the income veloc-
ity of money was unsustainably low. At the same time, it was widely felt that
much of the increase in the money stock had come into the hands of black
market operators or war profiteers, so that a proportional shrinkage of
money balances would not be a"just" solution.
Lieftinck writes: "On July 9th, 1945, as a first measure against hoarding
of money made in the black market, all 100 guilder notes were withdrawn
from circulation. Subject to a brief time limit, the facility was opened for
holders of such notes, to be credited for the amount on a blocked bank
account" (the 100 guilder note was the largest denomination in circulation
at the time). On September 26, 1945 the government withdrew all bank notes
in circulation and blocked all bank deposits. At the same time the existing
bank secrecy law was suspended. "This measure was intended to serve three
6"The Post-War Financial Rehabilitation of the Netherlands", The Iie~gue, Mar-
tinus Nijhojj, 1973.
~ In 1938 national income at market prices equaled 5.4 billion guilders; the War had
reduced national income to approximately 3 billion guilders in early 1945 (annual
rate).
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objectives. The first was to bring into the open all money holdings, in par-
ticular those improperly acquired during the years of foreign occupation ...
The second was to register all liquid assets for the purpose of tax assessment
under the existing tax legislation and the special reconstruction taxes that
were going to be imposed. The third and most important objective was to re-
establish an appropriate relationship between the quantity of goods avail-
able and the supply of money in circulation."
During the week following the currency withdrawal and blocking of bank
deposits, each citizen received an identical small nominal amount of money
and later that same week additional money was released to finance wages
earned over the week. In subsequent weeks the government continued to
release money for wage payments as well as special releases to meet firms'
requirements for working capital. Bank credit remained subject to licensing
and often required investigation of all blocked accounts owned by the firm.
In Liejtincks words: "By the end of 1945 the ratio between national income
and the amount of money in circulation had almost returned to its pre-war
level."
"The government opened different options for theremaining blocked
money:
(1) continuation of these holdings on blocked account in the hope and
expectation of future releases;
(2) transfer of limited amounts to a medium-term savings account;
(3) use of these holdings for payment of tax arrears incurred during the
occupation;
(4) use of these holdings to fulfil obligations in respect to the new special
reconstruction taxes to be imposed;
(5) subscription to long-term, low-interest bearing Government loans".
Because the last three options were most popular, the blocked money
became available to the Treasury, "were it was held and only gradually
released for public spending according to the growing needs connected with
the rehabilitation of the economy".
As a result of these measures, the income velocity of money which had fal-
len to approximately 0.3 at war end and 0.45 in the summer of 1945, rose to
almost 2(very similar to the 1938 level) in December of 1945 and remained
very stable around that level for the next four years. The nominal money
supply had been reduced from 11 billion guilders in May 1945 to 4.1 billion
guilders at the year-end. "Thereafter it rose steadily and it was practically
stabilized at the level of around 7,2 billion guilders in 1948". Wholesale
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prices increased by 25 - 30 percent between 1945 and 1948 whereas the cost
of living went up by 16 percent. Real wages were virtually stable.
I quote from Lieftinck's description of the accompanying tax reform:
"Since during the war years tax evasion had been practiced on a large
scale and tax assessment had run into a backlog, supplementary tax decla-
rations were imposed with respect to all existing direct taxes, and provi-
sional tax assessments were made covering the year 1944 and the first eight
months of 1945. In order to speed up the collection of tax arrears and in anti-
cipation of the announced reconstruction taxes, a system of voluntary and
obligatory tax deposits (advance payments to the Treasury) was introduced
which by the end of 1946 amounted to over 1,800 million guilders. To sup-
plement the revenue from normal taxes, two special reconstruction taxes
were imposed:
(1) a so-called capital increase levy on the accrual during the war years of
all personal wealth (money holdings and all other assets taxable under
the existing wealth tax), at a rate of 50 to 90 per cent differentiated on
the basis of a propriety test of the nature of the acquisition and the
amount of the increase;
(2) a so-called once-for-all capital levy on all personal wealth at the end of
the war, at a rate of 4 to 20 per cent by application of a progression scale.
The collection of these special taxes, the total yield of which amounted to
over 3,000 million guilders, was spread over a number of years, and to the
extent that they were not paid out of blocked accounts these levies contrib-
uted considerably to counteracting otherwise generated new inflationary
pressures. With a view to making the Government budget a better policy
instrument adjusted to the circumstances, its structure was for the time
being modified. Instead of the traditional division in two parts, a current
account and a capital account, the current budget was divided in an ordi-
nary account, an extra-ordinary account and a separate budget chapter for
the newly established Agricultural Equalization Fund. The ordinary
account covered normal recurrent expenditures. The exti~a-ordinary
account covered all expenditures that were directly connected with those
functions of the Government that were undertaken to cope with the disloca-
tion of the economy, including war damages, and, therefore, were consid-
ered to be of a temporary character (the administration and liquidation of
the war heritage). The budget of the Agricultural Equalization Fund served
to give an estimate of the balance of the cost of farm and consumer subsidies
and the yield of agricultural export levies, the former being required to
ensure a reasonable remuneration to the farmers while at the same time
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keeping the food bill of the consumers down. Its actual outcome was highly
dependent on changes in world market prices; and given the objectives just
mentioned, the balance of this account could not be predicted reliably. The
capital budget maintained its traditional character of covering expenditures
that increased the durable assets of the public domain and the revenues
dcrived from those assets. Particularly the introduction of the extra-ordi-
nary account in lhe current budget proved to serve an extremely useful pur-
pose because it avoided the mixing up of recurrent and non-recurrent
expenditures, facilitated a special surveillance and an appropriate phasing
of the latter, and embodied a constant reminder that those expenditures
w-ere temporary and should be abolished as soon as possible".
The Dutch government was not faced in 1945 with widespread use of for-
eign currency. Also, convertibility of the guilder was postponed until the
next decade. In the 1950's the European Payments Union (EPU) remained
the institutional mechanism for international payments until late 1958. The
return to convertibility was postponed for so many years in Western Europe
because of a perceived "dollar shortage". This term only makes sense if one
assumes a general dollar overvaluation of the West-European currencies
during the immediate post-war years.e Because in Eastern Europe unofficial
markets provide information about the exchange rate between local money
and the DMark or US dollar, there should be no excuse for establishing an
exchange rate that ~vould undervalue the DMark or pollar to such an extent
that it would make sense to speak of a DMark or pollar shortage. Hence, the
historical experience in Western Europe with the EPU in the post-war
period does not offer many direct lessons for Eastern Europe today, apart
from the obvious one that it is hazardous to fix exchange rates in periods of
great economic transition. However, the Dutch experience with a currency
reform immediately after the War is of interest as a historical case-study of
the removal of a monetary overhang larger than a full year's national income
in a way that was democratically acceptable.
VI. Need for a Nominal Anchor
During the transition to a market economy forecasts of nominal national
income at market prices will be subject to large forecasts errors. At the same
time, the income velocity of money will depend on trends in economic
growth and inflation, as well as on the availability of money substitutes,
" See: Peter BoJinqer: "A Multilateral Payments Union for Eastern Europe?",
Discussion Paper nr. 458, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London 1990.
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both ín the form of domestic savings accounts and in the form of foreign cur-
rency. The Polish example has shown already how quickly the importance of
foreign currency for domestic transactions can change over time, and this
will make estimates of the velocity of money even more hazardous. With
both national income and velocity being so hard to forecast, how can the
Central Bank provide a nominal anchor for the economy if one rejects the
option of fixing the exchange rate for a long period as I have done in this
paper?
Perhaps the Dutch example may offer a useful suggestion. Lieftinck
suggests in his book that the authorities were able to make continuous esti-
mates of at least a very large proportion of national income by monitoring
trends in wages. During the first few months after the currency reform the
Central Bank apparently set a path for the money stock on the basis of its
estimates of wages paid to workers.s If indeed the quality of up-to-date
statistics on wages is clearly superior to the statistics on output or domestic
sales, than it may make sense for a brief period to use estimates on the
incomes side for setting monetary policy. Assuming the authorities will con-
tinue to determine wages in the socialized sector, it should be possible to
allow for free wage formation in the privatized sector of the economy and to
free almost all domestic prices whilst maintaining a perspective on nominal
developments in the economy by monitoring very. closely trends in wages.
During this first stage, an anti-inflationary policy would effectively mean a
consistent policy on wages in the nationalized sector. In the Dutch case, the
income velocity of money became remarkably stable from year-end 1945
onwards, i. e. no more than 8 months after the war. Once velocity has
stabilized, the Central Bank could try to target the rate of growth of an
appropriate monetary aggregate, using the type of feed-back rule advocated
by many monetary economists.io
VII. Envoi
The East European nations are discussing convertibilily of their curren-
cies under exciting but very difficult political conditions. The movement
towards politically and economic freedom should in my view include the
transition to a fully convertible currency, and I have tried to provide some
arguments in favour of making the currency convertible as soon as it is
political feasible to conduct a fiscal policy that does not reqtlire inflationary
9 In addition, as shown in the quotation above, the Central Bank helped to provide
credit to enterprises.
io See for example, B. McCallum, Monetary Theory, MacMillan, 1989.
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finance of the budget deficit. Many of the points in this paper were well
expressed in a recent conference contribution by Hahn-Been Lee, a former
deputy Prime Minister of South Korea who spoke on "The change in the
East Bloc"."
"Once the Europeans achieve equalization of domestic prices with exter-
nal prices, they ~vill gain the confidence of their people, who will then be
able to trust their own currency ... Once people begin to have that valuable
lrust in their own currency, they begin to adopt the habit of saving, making
investment possible. Saving is a prerequisite for the privatization of state-
owned industries. Only after such successful economic management does
popular democracy have a fair chance at stability ..."
"Postscript: in February 1991 the Bulgarian authorities introduced a rad-
ical price reform and went most of the way to currency convertibility. The
domestic price level went up by an estimated 150 - 200 percent, but sub-
sequently fell by an estimated 15 percent in March. The Lev appreciated
very substantially and the gap between the black market rate and the offi-
cial rate virtually disappeared. At the time of writing - early April - foreign
banks provide trade credits for Bulgaria, the current account deficit appears
to have closed and spread between buy and sell rates of Lev in Vienna have
narrowed to a few percent. The IMF has expressed strong support for the
price and exchange rate policies of the Bulgarian authorities and the econ-
omy would seem ready for privatisation".
Zusammenfassung
Konvertierbarkeit der Wa~hrungen: wann und wie?
In dieser Arbeit fiihre ich die der Konvertierbarkeit der W~hrungen traditionell
eigenen Vorteile unter besonderem Hinweis darauf auf, daB eine Liberalisierung des
internationalen Handels zur Anpassung der relativen Binnenmarktpreise an den
jeweiligen realen Wert beitrágt. Dies ist fur die ehemals sozialistischen Lánder in Mit-
tcl- und Osteuropa besonders wichtig, da sie fur die Subventionierung von Vorlei-
stungen, Konsumgiitern und Energie bekannt sind. Auch erfordert die Einfuhrung
westlicher Buchfiihrungskonzepte aussagekráftige relative Preise: In dieser Arbeit
wird argumentiert, da[3 politischer Druck zugunsten einer Fortfiihrung der Subven-
tionspraxis sich leichter uberwinden láLit, wenn die Konvertierbarkeit der Wkhrung
eine Anpassung der relativen Binnenmarktpreise an das international ubliche Niveau
erzwingt.
" Wall Street Journal, July 13, 1990.
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Nach einer Ertirterung mehrerer mtiglicher Szenarien fur die W~hrungskonvertier-
barkeit einschlieBlich Prof. Meltzers Vorschlag, dem Beispiel einer 10096igen Dek-
kung der Inlandswáhrung durch Devisen wie im Falle Hongkongs zu folgen, schlieBe
ich die Arbeit mit einem Pládoyer fur die volle Konvertierbarkeit von Zahlungen aus
den laufenden Transaktionen bei gleichzeitiger Zielfestsetzung fur gewisse nominale
BinnenwirtschaftsgrdBen ab. Zu Beginn k6nnte das Lohnniveau des Landes sich fur
eine solche Mengenzielfestsetzung als die geeignetste Gr6Be erweisen; spkter kbnnte
das Lohnniveau vom Nominaleinkommen oder der Inflationsrate abgelbst werden,
nachdem sich die Einkommenskreislaufgeschwindigkeit des Geldes genugend stabili-
siert hat, um eine Geldmengenzielfestsetzung zu ermóglichen.
Summary
Currency Convertibility: When and How?
In this paper I list the traditional advantages of currency convertibility with special
emphasis on the point that liberalization of international trade will help to adjust
domestic relative prices to their correct world values. This is especially important for
the formerly socíalist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, because of their
history of subsidization of inputs, consumer products, and energy. The introduction of
Western-style accounting concepts also requires useful relative prices: the paper
argues that political pressures in favour of continuation of subsidies will be easier
to overcome if a convertible currency forces domestic relative prices to adjust to
international standards.
After discussion of a number of possible scenarios for currency convertibility,
including Professor Meltzer's suggestion to follow the Hong Kong example of 100 oI~
international reserve backing for the domestic money, I conclude the paper with a
plea for full convertibility on current account, combined with the targeting of some
domestic nominal magnitude. In the first stage, domestic wages might be the most
appropriate target, to be replaced by nominal income or inflation when the income
velocity of money has stabilized sufficiently to make monetary targeting feasible.
Bésumé
Convertibilité des monnaies: yuand et commenl?
Dans ]e présent travail, j'énumère les avantages traditionnels de la convertibilité
des monnaies, en insistant spécialement sur le point que la libéralisation du commerce
international aidera à ajuster les prix relatifs nationaux à leurs valeurs correctes
mondiales. Ceci est particulièrement important pour les anciens pays socialistes
d'Europe centrale et de 1'Est à cause de leur histoire de subventionnement des inputs,
des biens de consommation et de 1'énergie. L'introduction de la compatibilité du style
occidental requiert aussi des prix relatifs utiles: I'auteur prouve ici que les pres~ions
politiques en faveur de la continuation de subsides seront plus faciles à surmonter si
une monnaie convertible force les prix relatifs nationaux à s'ajuster aux standards
internationaux.
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Après avoir discuté un nombre de scénarios possibles pour la convertibilité des
monnaies, y compris la suggestion du protesseur MeLtzer de suivre le modèle de Hong-
Kong de réserve internationale à 1004'o pour soutenir la monnaie nationale, je conclus
mon travail en sollicitant de facon pressante une pleine convertibilité sur comptes
courants, combinée avec 1'objectif de quelques grandeurs nominales nationales. Dans
la première étape, les salaires nationaux seront probablement 1'objectif le plus
approprié, puis ce sera le revenu nominal ou 1'inflation lorsque la vitesse de la mon-
naie par rapport au revenu aura été suffisamment stabilisée que pour permettre de
réaliser des objectifs monétaires.
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